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CASEN07'ES
Sale of Real Estate by Display of "For Sale" Signs as Protected Commer-
cial Speech:—Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro' —The Township of
Willingboro is a residential community of approximately 44,000 people lo-
cated in southern New jersey. 2 As its overall rate of population growth
slowed to approximately three percent during the early 1970's, the town-
ship's racial composition changed significantly. 3 Although this did not cause
any section of the Township to become racially identifiable,`' members of
the community became concerned about the changing population. 5 Believ-
ing that a major cause of the change was "panic selling" by white residents
who feared that Willingboro was becoming all black and that property
values would decline, the townspeople concluded that the display of "For
Sale" and "Sold" signs significantly exacerbated such fears.' Evidence pre-
sented during extensive public discussion," however, indicated that the
turnover rate of home sales was actually quite low and that the increase in
property values was comparatively high." Nonetheless, on March 18, 1974
the Township Council unanimously approved Ordinance 5-1974, which
' 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
2 1d. at 87.
3 Id. Previously, Willingboro had experienced a dramatic population increase during the
1960's when the white population grew nearly 350% and the non-white population rose over
11%. Between 1970 and 1973, however, the white population decreased by almost 2,000 per-
sons (5.3%) as the non-white population increased by snore than 3,000 persons (60%). Id.
4 Linmark Associates, inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir.
1976).
5 431 U.S. at 88.
In communities experiencing a change in racial composition, their difficulties may be
compounded by the presence of two related but distinct phenomena: "panic selling" and
"blockbusting." Because panic selling refers to the sale of property by homeowners who fear
the effects of racial transition and blockbusting refers to the practice of real estate brokers in
encouraging such sales, it is important to distinguish between the two. In a similar case involv-
ing the validity of an ordinance banning the display of "For Sale" signs, Barrick Realty, Inc. v.
City of Gary, 354 F. Sum), 126 (N.D. lnd. 1973), affd, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), the dis-
trict court provided a concise explanation of the distinction between the two practices:
Blockbusting refers to the practice of directly inducing or persuading an in-
dividual to sell his home by representations as to the entry into his neighborhood
of blacks or other minority groups. Panic selling is a broader problem which,
although it may be prompted by blockbusting practices, does not depend upon
direct inducements or face-to-face contact between people. Panic selling occurs
when a resident who is otherwise disposed to remain in a neighborhood suc-
cumbs to any one or more of a number of pressures to move out when it appears
that a minority racial group is beginning to enter.
Id. at 134-35. Further, it is important to note that blockbusting activities have been prohibited
by the federal government. Fair Housing Chapter of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, §804(e), 42
U.S.C. §3604(e) (Stipp. V 1975).
7
 431 U.S. at 87-88.
Id. at 88. Departing from its usual procedure of conducting a public hearing only
after the proposed law received initial approval by the ToWnship Council, the Council held
public hearings both before and after it considered and approved the ordinance. Further, the
Council contacted National Neighbors (a national organization which promotes integrated
housing) for advice and the proposed ordinance was endorsed by the Willingboro Human Re-
lations Commission. Id.
" The Court noted that:
With respect to the justification for the ordinance, the Council was told (a) that a
study of Willingboro home sales in 1973 revealed that the turnover rate was
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proscribed the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in residential areas of
Willingboro.'°
Linmark Associates, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, owned property
in Willingboro which was placed for sale in March, 1974." During the next
four months, William Mellman, the agent with whom Linmark's property
was listed, received complaints from Linmark and other property owners of
slowness in furnishing buyers and of the absence of "For Sale" signs." As a
result, petitioners Linmark and Mel!man brought an action in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey to have the ordinance
declared unconstitutional and to enjoin the Township of Willingboro and
its building inspector, co-respondent Gerald Daley, from enforcing the
ban.''
The district court declared the ordinance unconstitutional, holding
that the Township's ban on the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs vio-
lated the petitioners' right of free speech." In the district court's view, the
ordinance impermissibly restricted the petitioners' interest in communicat-
ing to others that property was for sale by limiting petitioners' ability to ex-
press their commercial message." The respondents appealed and, in a di-
roughly 11%.. ; (b) that in February 1974—a typical month-230 "For Sale"
signs were posted among the 11,000 houses in the community ...; and (c) that
the Willingboro Tax Assessors had reported that "by and large the increased
value of Willingboro properties was way ahead of ... comparable communities."
Id. at 89. In view of its transient population, id. at 90, Willingboro had a suprisingly low turn-
over rate compared to a national average estimated to be as high as 20%. See Molotch, Racial
Change in a Stable Community, 75 Am." ot: Sue, 226, 228 (1969-70).
10
 431 U.S. at 88. Chapter XVII of the Revised General Ordinances of the Township of
Willingboro regulates the erection and maintenance of signs. Prior to the enactment of Ordi-
nance 5-1974, the relevant sections of Chapter XVII were as follows:
17-2 LEGALITY. Signs may be erected and maintained in the Township of
Willingboro only when the same comply with the provisions of this chapter, and
it shall he unlawful to erect or maintain any sign at arty place within the said
Township of Willingboro when the same does not comply with the provisions of
this chapter.
17-6 RESIDENTIAL ZONES. The following signs are permitted in those areas
of the Township of Willingboro which have been zoned for residential use.
17-6.5 RENTAL SIGNS. Signs pertaining to the lease, rental or sale of the
premises on which they appear, subject to the following conditions:
a. The size of the sign shall not exceed eight square feet in area.
b. The sign shall be located upon the premises to which it pertains and shall not
project beyond the property line of such premises.
c. Such signs shall be removed within five days after the execution of any lease,
rental agreement or agreement of sale or the premises in question by the occu-
pant of the premises and/or the owner of the sign.
d. Not more than two such signs are to be placed upon any property.
535 F.2d at 805-06. Ordinance 5-1974 repealed section 17-6.5, thereby in effect prohibiting
the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in residential areas of Willingboro. Id. at 806. How-
ever, several categories of signs continued to be permitted under section 17-6. Id. at 805 n.l.
" 431 U.S. at 86.
12 535 F.2d at 792.
Although unreported, the district court opinion was reproduced in the court of ap-
peals decision at 535 F.2d at 792 n.5.
' 4 Id.
15 Id. In addition, by restricting access to information regarding the sale of houses in
Willingboro, the ordinance was held to infringe upon a potential purchaser's right to travel.
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vided opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that the ordinance was
"constitutionally acceptable as a reasonable means to halt early panic selling
and its incipient segregation effects."" The court of appeals characterized
the message expressed by "For Sale" and "Sold" signs as commercial
speech," and construed the ordinance as a valid regulation of the place
and manner of the signs' display." The circuit panel found Willingboro's
interest in preventing the destructive effects of panic selling sufficient to
justify whatever incidental limitations on freedom of speech might result
from the prohibition of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 20 and reversed. In a unani-
mous decision,2 ' the Court HELD: an ordinance which proscribes the dis-
play of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs violates the first amendment where the
evidence fails to establish its necessity to further the important govern-
mental interest in stable, integrated neighborhoods. 22
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that the mes-
sage inherent in the "For Sale" and "Sold" signs is entitled to constitutional
protection for three reasons. First, the individual and societal interests in
the communication and receipt of the real estate sales information in Lin-
mark 23 rendered the signs indistinguishable from the abortion and drug ad-
vertisements held to be protected commercial speech in Bigelow v. Virginia 24
and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc." Second, rather than an acceptable regulation of the place or manner
of expression, 20 the ban on the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs was
Id. As explained by the district court, Itiravel, in this sense, refers to migration with intent to
settle and abide, not mere movement," citing Wellf'ord v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143, 147 n.9
(D. Del. 1972), affd, 485 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir. 1973).
'° 535 F.2d al 800.
"Id, at 796.
'"Id. at 795.
' 9 Id. at 797. Further, citing the fact that over 70% of the inquiries regarding the pur-
chase of homes in Willingboro resulted from sales techniques other than signs, the court of
appeals dismissed the contention that the ordinance impeded a potential purchaser's right to
travel. Id. at 804.
" 429 U.S. 938 (1976).
" 431 U.S. at 87. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of
Linmark. Id. at 98.
"Id. at 95-97.
" Id. at 92.
" 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
" 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
" 431 U.S. at 93-4. Governmental limitations on the time, place and manner of com-
munication of protected expression have been upheld in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (regulation of location of theatres showing adult movies); Lehman
v, City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974) (regulation prohibiting political adver-
tising on city transit system vehicles); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (regulation of
amplified sound trucks); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575.76 (1941) (regulation of
parades). However, such regulations have been found unconstitutional because of their en-
croachment upon protected speech where: they discriminate on the basis of content, Erznoz-
nik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206, 211-12 (1975) (ordinance prohibiting drive-in
movie theatre to exhibit films containing nudity) and Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of a school, except
labor picketing); they are overly broad, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52, 557 (1965)
(convictions of peaceful protesters for disturbing the peace and obstructing public passages
overturned because of vagueness of' the statute and the unfettered discretion of officials).
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directed impermissibly toward the primary effect of the message of the
signs, thereby causing suppression of the content of' the message." Third,
because the ordinance restricted constitutionally protected expression, it
was subjected to close scrutiny." Although conceding that the Township's
goal of promoting stable, integrated neighborhoods is a strong govern-
mental interest consistent with national policy, 29 the Court found the ordi-
nance unnecessary to accomplish the objective in view of the factual data
presented. 3°
The significance of the decision in Linmark is threefold. First, by find-
ing the subject matter of the advertising in Linmark indistinguishable for
constitutional purposes from that of Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy, the
Court reaffirms the protection accorded to commercial speech under the
first amendment. Second, Linmark makes clear that the individual and
societal interests in the free flow of truthful and legitimate commercial in-
formation may not be impaired where the evidence fails to establish the
necessity of regulation to promote a vital and important governmental ob-
jective. Third, the decision will have a significant practical impact upon
municipal efforts to deal with the social problems of racial transition, panic
selling, and white flight.
This casenote will focus on the Supreme Court's application of first
amendment protection to the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs. The
note will discuss Linmark in light of the constitutional status of commercial
speech subsequent to Virginia Pharmacy, the time, place and manner doc-
trine, and the analysis employed where first amendment interests conflict
with an important governmental objective. Last, the impact of Linmark on
municipal efforts to stem panic selling and white flight by banning the dis-
play of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs will be considered from two perspec-
tives: whether evidence of severe community disruption directly attributa-
ble to the proliferation of such signs may justify prohibition of their dis-
play, and whether a ban on the display of such signs is effective in reduc-
ing panic selling and slowing white flight in a community experiencing ra-
cial transition.
I. LINMARK AND FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
The Township of Willingboro sought to justify its prohibition of the
display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs on the grounds that the ban was
permissible in view of the commercial nature of the speech at issue, was a
reasonable limitation on the place and manner of communication, and was
In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), involving ordinances prohibiting
demonstrations in the vicinity of schools, an antinoise ordinance was upheld, id. at 119-21,
while an antipicketing ordinance was found unconstitutional. Id. at 107. "The crucial question
is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a par-
ticular place at a particular time," Id. at 116.
27 431 U.S. at 94.
28 1d. at 94-96. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) ("It is firmly established
that a significant impairment of First Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny");
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) ("U -Me subordinating interests of the State must sur-
vive exacting scrutiny").
" 431 U.S. at 94-95.
"Id. at 95-96. See also note 9 supra.
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necessary to achieve a subordinating governmental objective. This section
will examine the Supreme Court's rejection of these arguments in its hold-
ing that the township's ordinance constituted an impermissible obstruction
of the free "flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information." 31
A. The Commercial Speech Question
The Township of Willingboro initially attempted to justify the con-
stitutional validity of its ordinance by characterizing the message inherent
in "For Sale" and "Sold" signs as a simple commercial proposal not entitled
to the same degree of protection accorded other types of expression."
However, the Supreme Court rejected this contention, citing its previous
decisions in Bigelow v. Virginia 33 and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumers Council. 34 Although in Virginia Pharmacy the Court
cautioned that differences in the characteristics of commercial speech may
give rise to "a different degree of protection," 33 the holding in that case ex-
tended first amendment protection to purely commercial proposals. 3" The
31 431 U.S. at 98.
" Id. at 91-92. The "commercial speech" exception first was enunciated, with neither ci-
tation nor explanation, in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (ordinance pro-
hibiting the distribution of commercial advertisements in the streets not a violation of the first
amendment). There the Supreme Court found no limitation on governmental regulation of
commercial speech, implying that it constituted economic activity rather than protected ex-
pression. Id. at 54. Erosion of the commercial speech exception began in New York Times,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (otherwise protected political expression not unprotected
because of use of medium of commercial newspaper advertisement). The Court noted that the
societal interest in the civil rights information expressed in the advertisement distinguished it
from the purely commercial message of Chrestensen. Id. at 266. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (government regulation pro-
hibiting newspaper employment advertisements classified according to sex not a violation of
first amendment), the Court rejected the Chrestensen implication of commercial speeds as eco-
nomic activity, holding that the first amendment speech interests of a commercial proposal
must be assessed independently of the conduct element. Id. at 386. Affirming ihe New York
Times view that 'speech is not rendered commercial by the mere fact that it relates to an ad-
vertisement," id. at 384, the Court suggested further erosion of the commercial speech
exception—and extension of constitutional protection to an "ordinary commercial
proposal"—awaited only a more conducive factual context in which the commercial activity it-
self was not illegal. Id. at 389.
" 421 U.S. 809 (1975). In holding unconstitutional the state's prohibition of a newspa-
per's publication of an advertisement for out-of-state abortion services, the Court in Bigelow
severely diminished the scope of the commercial speech exception. The Chrestensen decision
was construed as merely a limitation on the manner of expression, rather titan a "sweeping
proposition that advertising is unprotected per se," which "has not survived reflection." Id. at
820 n.6. However, the Court expressly declined to consider the precise "extent to which con-
stitutional protection is afforded commercial advertising under all circumstances and in the
lace of all kinds of regulation." Id. at 826.
" 425 U.S. 748 (1976). It is important to note that the court of appeals' decision in
Lininark was rendered prior to the Supreme Court's consideration of Virginia Pharmacy. 431
U.S. at 92 n.6. As a result, the court of appeals relied upon the vitality of the commercial
speech exception remaining after Bigelow in agreeing with the township that the commercial
message expressed by the "For Sale" and "Sold" signs was entitled to a lesser degree of con-
stitutional protection. 535 F.2d at 796.
an 425 U.S. at 771 11.24. In addition, the Court noted that the state retains its traditional
power to regulate the time, place and manner of' communication, id. at 771, false or deceptive
advertising, id., advertising of activities themselves illegal, id. at 772, and advertising on elec-
tronic broadcast media, id. at 773.
"Id. at 771-73.
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Court in Virginia Pharmacy identified three distinct first amendment in-
terests in considering whether a state constitutionally could be permitted to
ban the advertisement of prescription drug prices as a means of ensuring
high quality pharmaceutical services: the interest of the advertiser in com-
municating his message, 37 the strong consumer interest in the receipt of
such commercial information,38 and the general societal interest in the
proper allocation of resources through informed private economic de-
cisions." In view of these interests, the Virginia Pharmacy Court held that
the free flow of "concededly truthful information about entirely lawful ac-
tivity" in the commercial area may not be suppressed. 4 °
This constitutional protection accorded commercial speech was re-
affirmed by the decision in Linmark. Concluding that there was no mean-
ingful distinction between the Willingboro ordinance and the statutes over-
turned in Virginia Pharmacy and Bigelow, the Supreme Court held that the
ordinance violated the first amendment by restricting the "flow of truthful
and legitimate commercial information."'" The Court in Linmark em-
phasized that the interests of petitioners in freely communicating their
message, of potential purchasers in receiving information regarding the
availability of real estate, and of society in general in the free flow of such
information were identical to those recognized in Virigina Pharmacy.'" Re-
jecting the Township's contention that the subject matter of the ban ren-
dered the ordinance constitutionally distinguishable from the advertise-
ments in Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy, the Court concluded that the In-
terests in the communication of commercial information are not lessened
by such differences in subject matter. 43
The Supreme Court in Linmark properly applied the expanded view
of the protection accorded commercial speech set forth in Virginia Phar-
macy. In effect, the holding indicates that where the goods or services are
not in themselves illegal and the commercial message is truthful, dif-
ferences in the type of services or goods are not significant for constitu-
tional purposes. Accordingly, Linmark affirms that in commercial speech
cases the first amendment is intended to ensure the free flow of informa-
tion rather than to protect any particular type of subject matter from gov-
ernmental regulation."
" Id., at 762-63.
3" Id. at 763-64.
as Id. at 765. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist also recognized the consumer and societal
interest in commercial information, but argued that these interests were more properly a con-
cern of the legislature than the court. Accordingly, he criticized the majority opinion as a re-
turn to substantive due process analysis. Id. at 785.84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4 ° Id, at 773. See, e.g., Note, Advertising of Prescription Drug Prices As Protected Commercial
Speech, 18 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. Rev, 276 (1977); Note, Commercial Speech and the First Amend-
ment, 5 HOESTRA L. REV. 655 (1977); Note, Protection of Commercial Speech, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 138
(1976).
-1 ' 431 U.S. at 97-98, quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
12 431 U.S. at 92.
43 Id. at 91-92.
"Id. Also, the suggestion of a product-services distinction in Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S.
at 773 n.25, has since been rejected by the Court in Bates v. State Bar,_U.S._, 97 S. Ct.
2691, (1977), in which the constitutional protection previously accorded truthful and legiti-
mate commercial product information was held to apply also to the advertisement of prices
for legal services in newspapers. Id. at 2700, 2709.
334
• CASENOTES
B. Limitation of the Place or Manner of Expression
Having determined that the communication at stake in Linmark is not
disqualified from first amendment protection, the Supreme Court next
considered the township's contention that the display of "For Sale" and
"Sold" signs could be prohibited as a valid limitation on the place or man-
ner of expression:16 The township argued that the ordinance merely pro-
scribed one place and manner of commercial advertising of real estate in
Willingboro. In addition, it emphasized that most inquiries regarding the
purchase of homes were due to sources of information other than signs, 46
implying that effective alternatives existed by which buyers and sellers
could communicate commercial information.
Although it affirmed the legitimacy of reasonable time, place or man
ner restrictions, the Court refused to characterize the Willingboro ordi-
nance as such a restriction for two reasons.'" First, noting that there were
"serious questions" as to whether options such as newspaper advertising
and listing with real estate brokers could be considered viable alternate
means of communication, the Court concluded that these alternatives were
"far from satisfactory." 48 The Court. identified three defects which ren-
dered such alternatives unacceptable: they were more expensive and less
autonomous; they were less likely to reach those not purposefully seeking
sales information; and they were less effective to communicate the message
inherent in "For Sale" and "Sold" signs." In view of the lack of satisfactory
4R 431 U.S. at 93. As stated succinctly in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), "the
First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been thought to give absolute protection to
every individual to speak whenever or whereever he pleases, or to use any form of address in
any circumstances that he chooses." Id. at 19.
" 431 U.S. at 89. Local real estate agents estimated that 30%-35% of the inquiries re-
garding the purchase of real estate in Willingboro resulted from prospective buyers seeing
"For Sale" and "Sold" signs. Id.
" Id. at 93-94.
4 '4 Id. at 93. Although this conclusion reversed the court of appeals Finding, 535 F.2d at
795, 797, and adopted that of the district court, id. at 792 n.5, the Supreme Court grounded
its result upon a different looting. Both lower courts agreed that the ordinance would impair
a seller's ability to dispose of his properly. Id. at 792 n.5, 797. They differed, however, as to
the constitutional significance of this impact on the seller's interest in communicating informa-
tion regarding the sale of his property. Whereas the district court found that the seller's in-
terest merited first amendment protection, id. at 792 n.5, the court of appeals viewed the sel-
ler's message as the type of commercial proposal characteristic of Valentine v. Chrestensen. Id. at
796. Since its decision was rendered prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Virginia Phar-
macy, the court of appeals accorded plaintiffS' commercial speech a lesser degree of protection
and construed the ordinance as a reasonable limitation on the place and manner of expres-
sion. M. at 795.
The lower courts also reached their contrary conclusions because of their different
views as to the effect of the ban in racial terms upon prospective purchasers. The district
court held that the ordinance, by prohibiting a means- by which potential purchasers could
identify housing opportunities themselves, would tend to encourage racially discriminatory
practices by real estate brokers. Id. at 793 n.5. Rejecting this claim, the court of appeals em-
phasized that no evidence bad been offered to substantiate such a conclusion. Id. at 803-04.
The Supreme Court, however, chose to frame the question of alternate means in terms of
their impact upon the free flow of the commercial information. Rather than evaluating the ef-
fect of the ban upon potential purchasers in terms of their fundamental right to travel, there-
fore, the Court considered the ordinance in terms of its impact upon the potential purchasers'
first amendment right to receive truthful and legitimate information, as well as upon the sel-
ler's right to disseminate such information. 431 U.S. at 92.
49 431 U.S. at 93.
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alternatives, therefore, rather than merely proscribing one manner of ex-
pression, the ban prohibited one of the most effective methods of com-
municating the message that property was for sale. Second, because the
display of signs other than "For Sale" or "Sold" was permitted under the
revised ordinance, 50
 the township could not attempt to justify the ban on
privacy or aesthetic grounds. 51 As a result, the ordinance constituted direct
suppression of the content of the message conveyed by "For Sale" and
"Sold" signs. 52
The Court correctly concluded that the ban attempted to suppress the
content rather than to regulate the form of the commercial expression. In
its effort. to reduce white flight by eliminating the appearance of panic sell-
ing caused by the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs, the township was
concerned with the effect or the signs' message upon Willingboro residents.
Rather than a content-neutral prohibition of the display of all types of signs
in residential neighborhoods, therefore, the ordinance specifically was in-
tended to suppress the particular message expressed by the "For Sale" and
"Sold" signs. Such a focus on the content rather than the form of com-
munication clearly placed the ban outside the scope of legitimate place and
manner restrictions.
C. Regulation of Speech to Achieve a Subordinating Governmental Objective
Alter finding both that petitioners' signs were not precluded from
constitutional protection and that the ban did not constitute an acceptable
limitation of the place or manner of expression, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the township's contention that its regulation of speech was justified
by the importance of the governmental objective it sought to achieve." In
effect, this alternative argument conceded that the ordinance encroached
upon freedom of expression, but rationalized such infringement by the im-
portance of the governmental interest in preserving stable, integrated
neighborhoods.
It is well-established that incidental limitations of freedom of expres-
sion may be permitted where necessary to further a compelling interest
which is unrelated to the suppression of protected speech and where such
limitations employ means narrowly tailored to the governmental objective. 54
In Linmark, the Court was asked to determine whether the importance of
achieving the township's goal of promoting stable, integrated neighbor-
hoods could justify restraint of petitioners' freedom of expression. The Su-
preme Court. characterized the township's objective as "vital," "important,"
and consistent with the national policy of encouraging fair housing oppor-
tunities. 55
 On its face, therefore, Willingboro's goal of preserving stable, in-
h° See note 10 supra.
5 ' 431 U.S. at 93-94.
52 id,
53 Id. at 94.
" United Stales v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 363 (1976) ("In short, if ... tthe government action] is to survive constitutional challenge.
it must further some vital government end by a means that is least restrictive ...").
55
 431 U.S. at 94-95.
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tegrated neighborhoods would appear to reach that level necessary to jus-
tify an impairment of protected speech in its implementation."
Noting that the interest advanced by the state in Virginia Pharmacy was
similarly important, however, the Court held the Willingboro ordinance
constitutionally impermissible for the same two reasons identified in in-
validatin the drug advertising ban in Virginia Pharmacy." First, the town-
ship's efforts to achieve its goal resulted in the direct suppression of pro-
tected commercial expression. Fearing that panic selling in Willingboro
would be exacerbated by the effect upon residents of the message inherent
in "For Sale" and "Sold" signs, the township sought to preserve stable, inte-
grated neighborhoods by prohibiting display of the signs." Finding this
approach constitutionally defective, the Supreme Court held that the con-
stitutionally acceptable means by which the township can promote the wel-
fare of its residents is "to open the channels of communication rather than
to close them."" Second, the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish the necessity of the ordinance to further the promotion of stable,
integrated neighborhoods. Despite the merits of the objective, the evidence
did not demonstrate that there was in fact a "substantial incidence of panic
selling," that the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs was a primary rea-
son for any panic selling, or that proscription of the display of such signs
actually would alleviate community fears and reduce white flight." Absent
such proof, the Court determined that the Willingboro ordinance was
based upon an unfounded fear of the signs' effect."
The Court's holding that the Willingboro ordinance directly suppres-
sed petitioners' commercial message precluded the need to determine
whether the ban was drawn sufficiently narrowly. The implication, how-
ever, is that the effect of the ordinance may have exceeded the incidental
limitation of protected expression which could be justified by the im-
portance of the governmental objective. Furthermore, the Court's de-
termination regarding the deficiencies of evidence of the ban's necessity is
particularly significant in view of its refusal to review a 1974 Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision upholding a similar ban on the display of
"For Sale" and "Sold" signs." In Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, the rec-
ord indicated that "For Sale" signs were causing an en masse departure of
white residents, who were replaced by blacks." By expressing no view on
this case, the Supreme Court followed its practice established in previous
" The nature of the required governmental interest has been characterized as
"paramount, one of vital importance," Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976); "compelling;
substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; [or] strong," United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
at 376-77.
" 431 U.S. at 95.
"Id, at 96-97.
" Id. at 97, quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 925 U.S. at 770.
'1 °431 U.S. at 95-96.
°' Id. at 96, Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969) ("undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to over-
come the right to freedom of expression"); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946)
("a solidity of evidence should be required" to justify curtailing freedom of speech).
62 Id. at 95 n.9, leaving intact the holding in Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491
F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).
63
 Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126, 134 (N.D. Ind. 1973).
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commercial speech cases of limiting the holding to the facts of the particu-
lar case." This implies, however, that a result contrary to Linmark might be
reached where the evidence establishes a substantial incidence of panic sell-
ing directly attributable to proliferation of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs and
susceptible to alleviation by a ban on the display of such signs. In effect,
the Court indicates in Linmark that the pursuit of an important govern-
mental objective may limit constitutionally protected commercial expression
if there is sufficient evidence to establish clearly that: a significant obstacle
to furtherance of an important governmental interest exists; the exercise of
an individual's freedom of expression is the major cause of that obstacle;
and impairment of the protected expression is necessary and effective in
achieving the governmental objective.
LINMARK AND MUNICIPAL EFFORTS TO STEM PAN IC SELLING AND
WHITE FLIGHT
The primary purpose of Ordinance 5-1974 of the Township of' Wil-
lingboro was to pi-omote stable, integrated neighborhoods. 65 In proscribing
the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs, the township sought to stem
what it perceived as panic selling and the accompanying flight of white res-
idents from the community. Ever since the promotion of integrated hous-
ing has been adopted as national policy, many communities have sought to
develop methods consistent with the promotion of racial integration to ad-
dress problems which threaten their stability.es The attempted solution re-
flected in Ordinance 5-1974 is not unique to the Township of Willingboro.
Such ordinances have been enacted with bi-racial support in other com-
munities." Prior to the decision in Linmark, the constitutional validity of
ordinances proscribing the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs had been
challenged in several cities." A few ordinances were declared invalid on
equal protection grounds under the fourteenth amendment." Most, how-
64 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 n.25; Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826; Pittsburgh Press Co.,
413 U.S. at 391.
65 431 U.S. at 94.
" See, e.g., Laska and Hewitt, Are Laws Against "For Sale" Signs Constitutional? Substantive
Due Process Revisited, 4 REAL Est'. L.J. 153, 154-55 (1975-76); Comment, Blockbusting: A Novel
Statutory Approach to An Increasingly Serious Problem, 7 COLUK I OF L. & Soc. Pito& 538, 558-65
(1971); Comment, Blockbusting: Judicial and Legislative Responses to Real Estate Dealers' Excesses, 22
DE PAUL. L. REV. 818, 834-36 (1972-73); Comment, Blockbusting, 59 GEo. L.J. 170, 171-74
(1970); Comment, The Constitutionality of a Municipal Ordinance Prohibiting "For Sale", "Sold", or
"Open" Signs to Prevent Blockbusting, 14 Si . . Louis L.J. 686, 700-08 (1970); Comment, Control of
Panic Selling by Regulation of "For Sale" Signs, 10 URa. L. ANN. 323, 327-28 (1975).
- "See Brief for Amici Curiae The Cities of Shaker Heights, Ohio and Cleveland
Heights, Ohio at 7-9 and Brief for Amiens Curiae City of Oak Park, Michigan at 2-3, Linmark
Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 91 (1977).
ee See, e.g., Howe v. City of St. Louis, 512 S.W. 2d 127, 128-29 (Mo. 1974); Allison v.
City of Akron, 45 Ohio App. 2d 227, 228-29, 343 N.E. 2d 128, 129-30 (1974); DeKalb Real
Estate Bd., Inc. v. Chairman and Bd. of Comm'rs of Roads and Revenues, 372 F. Supp. 748,
750 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Leet v. City of Eastlake, 7 Ohio App.2d 218, 219-20, 200 N.E. 2d 121,
12 (1967); Burk v. Municipal Court, 299 Cal. App. 2d 696, 698-700, 40 Cal. Rptr. 425, 426-27
(1964).
69 See, e.g., Allison, 45 Ohio App. 2d at 231, 343 N.E.2d at 131 (ban of "For Sale" signs
in one geographic area of-city denial of equal protection); DeKalb, 372 F. Supp. at 754-55 (ban
of "For Sale" signs applicable to real estate brokers, while exempting private homeowners, de-
nial of equal protection).
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ever, were upheld as reasonable excises of the government's police power
to promote the public welfare by regulating economic activity, thereby sur-
viving challenges based upon the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment." Because the cases were decided prior to
Virginia Pharmacy, challenges to the validity of such ordinances based on
first amendment freedom of speech grounds generally were rejected. Ad-
hering to the narrow view of the commercial speech principles then applic-
able, courts upheld the validity of prohibitions of the display of "For Sale"
and "Sold" signs as acceptable regulations of unprotected commercial
speech.' [
The leading case upholding such a ban is Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City qf
Gary," upon which the court of appeals in Linmark relied heavily in its de-
cision and upon which the Supreme Court in Linmark expressed no opin-
ion." In Barrick, the validity of an ordinance of the City of Gary, which
proscribed the posting of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in residential areas 74
was challenged by local real estate agents. While adopting as its own a fed-
eral district court ruling that the ordinance violated neither the fourteenth
amendment nor state and federal fair housing statutes," the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Barrick considered closely the effect of the ban upon first amend-
ment interests." The court of appeals noted that there was evidence of il-
legal blockbusting activity in Gary and concluded that the display of "For
Sale" and "Sold" signs was part of a "pattern of transactions" which un-
lawfully urged white homeowners to sell quickly. 77
 The court of appeals,
therefore, held that there was no need to consider any first amendment in-
terests inherent in the commercial proposal expressed by the signs, because
their close relationship to an illegal activity precluded constitutional protet
tion." Although conceding that "the very purpose of the ordinance is cen-
sorial," the court found that the signs were not "pure speech ... [but] a
mixture of speech and conduct." 78
 Relying upon the vitality of the com-
mercial speech exception which remained at that time, the court of appeals
held that the signs could be regulated validly as economic activity."
By deliberately expressing no view on the question whether the
Seventh Circuit decision in Barrick can survive its recent decision, the Su-
preme Court implied that a contrary result to that in Linmark may be
" See, e.g., Howe, 512 S.W. 2d at 132; Burk, 229 Cal. App. 2d at 702-03, 40 Cal. Rptr. at
428-29. Contra, Leet, 7 Ohio App.2d at 221, 220 N.E. 2d at 124 (ban of "For Sale" signs not
reasonable exercise of police power).
7 ' See, e.g., Howe, 512 S.W. 2d at 130-31. Contra, DeKalb, 372 F. Supp. at 755-56.
" 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).
73
 431 U.S. at 95 n.9.
71
 354 F. Supp. at 128 n. I.
" Id. at 135-36.
76
 491 F.2d at 163-64.
"Id. at 164.
76 1d. at 163-64.
" Id. at 164. It should be noted that the speech/conduct distinction was not raised in
Linmark, which instead focused on the appropriate standard of protection applicable to speech
of a commercial nature.
"° Id. The court of appeals relied primarily upon the vitality of the commercial speech
exception subsequent to the decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Cowen on Human Re-
lations. See note 32 supra.
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reached in a case analogous to Barrick if the evidence clearly demonstrates
the necessity of a ban on the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs. Ac-
cordingly, a comparision of the facts in Bat-rick and Linmark may be helpful
in assessing the precedential effect of both decisions for communities at-
tempting to stem panic selling and white flight.
A comparison of the two cases must address the three facts impliedly
required to be supported by evidence sufficient to establish the necessity of
employing restrictive ordinances such as those in Bat-rick and in Linmark: a
significant amount of' panic selling, a cause and effect relationship between
the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs and panic selling, and the effec-
tiveness of the ban in alleviating panic selling and white flights' In Lin-
mark, the Supreme Court observed that an annual property turnover rate
of approximately eleven percent in Willingboro was an insufficient in-
cidence of panic selling to justify a ban on the display of signs." By con-
trast, the evidence in Bat-rick demonstrated an en masse departure of white
residents from the City of Gary and their replacement by blacks. Between
1960 and 1970, the white population of Gary decreased nearly twenty-five
percent while the black population increased almost thirty-five percent. 83
The district court in Barrick found this evidence of community disruption
so compelling that survival of the ordinance was held necessary for the
community to preserve any hope of restoring neighborhood stability.84
In considering whether any panic selling in the township was attribut-
able to the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs, the Supreme Court in
Linmark noted that no causal relationship between the proliferation of signs
and increased panic selling was established by the presence of such signs in
front of two percent of the homes in Willingboro. 85 In Barrick, however,
there was evidence of illegal blockbusting activities by real estate brokers in
connection with the display of For Sale" signs." The court of appeals de-
" 431 U.S. at 95-96.
"2 1d. See note 9 supra.
"3 354 F. Supp. at 134.
as
	 at 135.
" 431 U.S. at 95-96. See note 9 supra.
86 491 F.2d at 163-64. See note 6 supra for a definition of blockbusting. The constitu-
tionality of the federal prohibition against blockbusting activities, Fair Housing Chapter of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, §804(e), 42 U.S.C. §3604(e) (Supp. V 1975), has been upheld as a
valid exercise of congressional power under the thirteenth amendment. E.g., Zuch v. Hussey,
394 F. Supp. 1028, 1046-47 (E.D. Mich. 1975); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305,
1312-13 (D. Md. 1969); Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
In addition, §3604(e) has been held to be a valid regulation of economic conduct, rather than
of speech, so that it does not violate the first amendment. E.g., United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 121-22 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476,
486 (N.D. Ga. 1971). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Bob Lawrence further held
that the government interest in preventing blockbusting outweighed the individual interest in
commercial expression. 474 F.2d at 122. State statutes and municipal ordinances prohibiting
blockbusting activities have been upheld on first and fourteenth amendment grounds. State v.
Wagner, 15 Md. App. 413, 422-24, 291 A.2d 161, 166-67 (1972) (speech aspect of blockbust-
ing activities not entitled to first amendment protection because integrally related to unlawful
conduct); Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530, 541-43, 548-53, 224
N.E.2d 793, 801-02, 805-07 (1967) (municipal ordinance not a denial of due process, equal
protection, or free speech).
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termined, therefore, that the combination of blockbusting activities and the
increasing display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs constituted a "pattern of
transactions" which the municipality properly could prohibit to alleviate
panic selling." This comparison of the facts presented in both cases in-
dicates, therefore, that Barrick can be distinguished by the presence there
of evidence establishing two of the required factors which the Supreme
Court found lacking in Linmark: a "substantial incidence of panic selling,"
and a causal relationship between the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs
and panic selling. 88
The facts presented in Barrack and Linmark are similar, however, in
that neither case provided evidence to support the third element required
to establish the necessity of a ban on the display of "For Sale" and "Sold"
signs—the effectiveness of such a ban in alleviating panic selling and white
flight. Despite the absence of supporting evidence, this question of effec-
tiveness was accepted as true by the court of appeals in Barrick." In Lin-
mark, however, the Supreme Court. emphasized that, "while this assumption
is certainly plausible,"" there must be evidence to confirm such an assump-
tion." The implication, therefore, is that subsequent to Linmark, whether
municipalities may employ ordinances similar to those in Barrick and in
Linmark may turn on the pragmatic consideration of their actual effective-
ness.
Two studies which examined communities experiencing racial transi-
tion and the impact of the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs upon
panic selling and white flight tend to establish that sign bans merely pro-
vide a temporary calming effect rather than an actual reduction of panic
selling. Contrary to the assumption relied upon by the Township of Wil-
lingboro and the courts of appeals in Barrick and Linmark, the studies con-
cluded that racial transition in a community does not necessarily cause
higher property turnover rates, a proliferation of "For Sale" signs, or a re-
duction in property values." Furthermore, ordinances prohibiting the dis-
play of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs appear to increase property turnover
rates because the lack of knowledge due to the bans often results in more
" 7 491 F.2d at 164.
" 431 U.S. at 95.
" 491 F.2d at 163-64.
" 431 U.S. at 96 n.10.
' 1 1d. at 95-96.
92 In Molotch, Racial Change in a Stable Community, 75 Am. J. OF Soc. 226 (1969.70), two
Chicago communities with similar demographic characteristics—one experiencing racial transi-
tion and one all-white area—were compared to test the assumption that racial transition neces-
sarily is accompanied by white flight and community disruption. Id. at 226-27. The study used
property turnover rates and the number of "For Sale" signs displayed as indicators of in-
stability, id. at 233, as did the courts of appeals in Linmark and Barrick. Based upon its analysis
of the data collected, the study revealed that racial transition in a community does not neces-
sarily give rise to higher turnover rates, id. at 230-31, a proliferation of "For Sale' . signs, id. at
233-34, or a reduction in property values, id. at 236. The conclusions of the study strike di-
rectly at the validity of the traditional assumption that communities experiencing racial transi-
tion are inherently unstable due to white flight. In effect, the study implies that the commu-
nity fears meant to be alleviated by the ordinance are in fact irrational. Thus, in addition to
their impairment of constitutionally protected commercial speech, such ordinances may have
the effect of perpetuating racial quotas and freezing in the effects of past discrimination, as
suggested by the district court in Linmark. See 535 F.2d at 792 n.5.
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fear and panic than would an absence of such bans." These results support
the wisdom of the Supreme Court's admonition in Linmark that free flow of
commercial information will yield a better informed citizenry."
The empirical data presented by these studies also supports the Su-
preme Court's finding in Linmark that if the evidence fails to establish the
potential effectiveness of a sign-ban ordinance, the ordinance cannot be
considered necessary to achieve the governmental interest in question. In
addition, such data may be significant in interpreting the Court's refusal in
Linmark to express an opinion on Barrick. Leaving the decision in Barrick in-
tact suggests that, in the Court's view, more substantial evidence of com-
munity disruption directly attributable to the proliferation of "For Sale"
signs may be sufficient to tip the scales in favor of the governmental in-
terests, despite the impact of the ordinance on commercial expression. In
view of the conclusions of the studies discussed above, however, the Su-
preme Court may be more concerned with whether a ban on signs actually
would be effective.95 From this latter perspective, a different conclusion
may be drawn regarding the future status of ordinances such as those in
Barrick and Linmark. Because these ordinances simply do not appear to be
effective, evidence establishing the severity and extent of panic selling and
white flight may become immaterial. Despite evidence of the necessity for
some type of governmental action to preserve stable, integrated com-
munities, therefore, use of an ordinance which proscribes the display of
"For Sale" and "Sold" signs but is ineffective in reducing panic selling could
be found unconstitutional because of its impairment of protected commer-
cial expression.
CONCLUSION
In Linmark, the Supreme Court affirmed rather than expanded the
constitutional principles it set forth in Virginia Pharmacy. Because the same
individual and societal interests in the communication and receipt of com-
mercial information identified in Virginia Pharmacy were found in Linmark,
the holding makes clear that first amendment protection of commercial ad-
vertising can be accorded other types of subject matter.
The decision in Linmark, however, will have more significant practical
impact upon municipal efforts to preserve stable, integrated neighborhoods
during periods of racial transition. The Court found the Willingboro ordi-
nance unconstitutional because of the absence of evidence tending to sup-
port its necessity. Whether an ordinance similar to that in Linmark could be
" In Hewitt, "An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of a Municipal Ordinance Prohibiting
the Use of On-Site Property Signs Within a Major Southeastern Standard Metropolitan Statis-
tical Area" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia State University, 1973), cited in Laska
Hewitt, Are Laws Against "For Sale" Signs Unconstitutional? Substantive Due Process Revisited, 4
REAL EST. L.J. 153, 160 n.28 (1975), the validity of the corollary assumption—that where a
community is experiencing racial transition, panic selling, and white flight, a prohibition of the
display of "For Sale" signs will decrease property turnover and alleviate community fears—was
tested in Decatur, Georgia. Id. at 160. In contrast to the assumption relied upon by the courts
of appeals in Barrick and Linmark, the study concluded that Itifie ordinance not only failed to
stabilize or lower property turnover rates, but in actuality appears to have the effect of in-
creasing them." M. at 161,
" 431 U.S. at 97.
" Id. at 96 n.10.
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upheld despite its impairment of protected commercial expression will de-
pend upon whether there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the ban
on the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs is effective in reducing a sub-
stantial incidence of panic selling which is attributable to the signs. If such
evidence can be established, the ban may be upheld since Linmark affirms
that common sense differences in commercial speech, based upon the fac-
tual context, may give rise to a different constitutional result. However, as
appears more likely in view of the difficulty in demonstrating the effective-
ness of the ordinances, the holding in Linmark that obstructions to the
communication of truthful and legitimate commercial information are for-
bidden by the first amendment suggests that communities will be compelled
to develop alternatives that do not abridge constitutionally protected ex-
pression.
MICHAEL M. HOGAN
Implied Warranty of Habitability in Federal Housing Projects: Alexander
v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development'—
Riverhouse Tower Apartments (Riverhouse) is a housing complex consist-
ing of two twelve-story buildings constructed with a mortgage insured by
the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).' The mortgagee defaulted on the loan and HUD acquired posses-
sion and managed the property after foreclosure. 5
By the time HUD foreclosed, Riverhouse had fallen into a "deplorable
condition":
The project was infested with roaches and vermin; elevators
were often inoperable; security was poor; hot water and heat
were inadequate or non-existent; the buildings were often
flooded; lighting was poor in the narrow hallways which were
often cluttered with garbage; plumbing was deficient, and some
tenants had electrical problems. 4
HUD chose to terminate the project rather than to make repairs. 5 Once the
project was vacant, HUD returned security deposits to those tenants who
were current in their rent but applied the amount to the balance due from
any tenant who was in arrears. 6
Tenants brought suit for the return of withheld security deposits on
the theory that HUD had breached an implied warranty of' habitability in
' 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Jan. 31,
1978) (No. 77-874).
2 /d. at 167. The mortgage was insured under 12 U.S.C. 	 1715I(d)(3) (1970). This sec-
tion is designed to assist private industry in providing housing for low income families
through subsidizing and insuring mortgages made by private lenders.
555 F.2d at 167. HUD's authority to foreclose property in default and subsequently to
manage such property is derived from 12 U.S.C. §§ 1713(k), 1713(1) (1970).
555 F.2d at 167-68.
3 /d. at 167.
" Id. at 168-69.
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